Wrongful Refusal to Settle: The Implications of Grundy in Kentucky by Crawford, Katharine R.
Kentucky Law Journal
Volume 65 | Issue 1 Article 8
1976
Wrongful Refusal to Settle: The Implications of
Grundy in Kentucky
Katharine R. Crawford
University of Kentucky
Follow this and additional works at: https://uknowledge.uky.edu/klj
Part of the Insurance Law Commons
Right click to open a feedback form in a new tab to let us know how this document benefits
you.
This Comment is brought to you for free and open access by the Law Journals at UKnowledge. It has been accepted for inclusion in Kentucky Law
Journal by an authorized editor of UKnowledge. For more information, please contact UKnowledge@lsv.uky.edu.
Recommended Citation
Crawford, Katharine R. (1976) "Wrongful Refusal to Settle: The Implications of Grundy in Kentucky," Kentucky Law Journal: Vol. 65 :
Iss. 1 , Article 8.
Available at: https://uknowledge.uky.edu/klj/vol65/iss1/8
WRONGFUL REFUSAL TO SETTLE: THE
IMPLICATIONS OF GRUNDY IN KENTUCKY
INTRODUCTION
American courts generally allow an insured to sue and
recover the amount he must pay in excess of his policy limits
when his insurance company has wrongfully refused to settle a
claim.' The same courts are plagued with the problem of how
to determine when the refusal to settle is wrongful, however.
Usually they begin this determination by subjecting the insurer
to an implied duty to settle even though no such duty is ex-
pressly written into the contract,2 and then use negligence or
bad faith standards to determine if there has been a breach of
this duty.3 There is wide disagreement over the definitions of
these standards and the tests based on these standards used to
determine an insurance company's breach of its obligation.'
Although many solutions to the problem of wrongful refusal to
settle have been proposed, 5 the trend has been toward holding
1 44 AM. JuR. 2d Insurance § 1530 (1969). It is when the action or claim against
the insured is for an amount in excess of policy coverage and the offer to settle is for
the policy limit or for a figure slightly below it that conflicts arise. The insured would
always prefer to have the claim settled, while the insurance company may benefit by
refusing to settle and chancing that the jury will render a judgment against their client
for substantially less than the amount offered or even render a verdict of no liability.
Jarrett, Lawsuits for Wrongful Refusal to Defend or to Settle, 28 INS. COUNSEL L.J. 58,
64-65 (1961). Under certain circumstances, for example, when the insured is clearly
liable and damages to the plaintiff appear extensive, courts have determined that a
refusal to settle is an unnecessary risk for the insurer to take with the insured's money.
Note that different courts and commentators use different labels for the suit in
which an insured sues his insurance company for failure to settle. The most common
terms include suit for wrongful failure to settle, suit for bad faith refusal to settle, and
excess liability suit. The above labels all refer to the same type of action.
2 Keeton, Liability Insurance and Responsibility for Settlement, 67 HARV. L. REv.
1136, 1138 (1954).
3 See, Annot., 40 A.L.R.2d 168-219 (1955). This paper deals mainly with problems
which have arisen over the bad faith standard.
Perhaps the main reason for the confusion over standards is the inherent diffi-
culty involved in attempting to judge an insurer's past treatment of the claim made
against its insured. Whether its refusal to settle was justifiable is dependent on a
multitude of variables, not readily condensable into a judicial standard.
5 Comprehensive articles include: 7A J. APPLEMAN, INSURANCE LAW AND PRACrICE
§§ 4711-4715 (2d ed. 1962); Evans, The Practical Handling by Defense Counsel of
Lawsuits in Excess of Policy Limits, 1960 INS. L.J. 565; Keeton, supra note 2; Sackville,
Duty of Insurer to Settle Within the Policy Limits, 1968 UTAH L. REV. 72; Annot., 40
A.L.R.2d 168 (1955); 44 AM. JuR.2d Insurance §§ 1530-1534 (1969).
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insurance companies to a standard which requires greater con-
sideration of the insured's interests.' In fact, many commenta-
tors have recently called for the imposition of strict liability on
the insurer,7 suggesting that any time an insurance company
refuses an offer to settle and a judgment against the insured for
more than his policy limits follows, the insurer should pay its
insured the excess.8
In the midst of these trends and proposals, the Supreme
Court of Kentucky9 has recently conceived a solution of its own.
In Manchester Insurance & Indemnity Co. v. Grundy,"' the
Supreme Court announced a total break with the old Kentucky
standard used to gauge the insurer's conduct," and declared
' "Because of the recent court decisions and their attendant publicity, we
[insurer] can now anticipate more and more suits based upon a wrongful refusal to
settle." Jarrett, Lawsuits for Wrongful Refusal to Defend or to Settle, 1961 INs.
COUNSEL L.J. 66, 66-67. "It is fair to state that under these circumstances [trend
towards holding insurer to higher standards] near perfection is demanded of the in-
surer not only in the investigation and negotiation of claims but in the opinions ulti-
mately reached respecting liability and settlement value. Because of the existing haz-
ard, an insurance company which has written a low limits policy has, in effect, also
written a contingent type of policy with no limits and for which it received no prem-
ium." Id. at 58. For a treatment of the most recent trends see text accompanying notes
69-80, infra.
I Hirsch, C. Carpenter, M. Carpenter, Strict Liability: A Response to the Gruen-
berg-Silberg Conflict Regarding Insurance Litigation Awards, 7 Sw. U.L. REv. 310
(1975); Note, Insurer's Refusal to Settle-A Proposal for Imposition of Liability Above
Policy Limits, 60 YALm L.J. 1037 (1951); Comment, Insurance: Strict Liability for
Insurance Companies in Excess Judgment Suits, 23 U. FLA. L. REv. 201 (1970); Com.
ment, Excess Liability Suits-The Mounting Need for Strict Liability, 13 ST. Louis
U.L.J. 292 (1968); Comment, Excess Liability: Reconsideration of California's Bad
Faith Negligence Rule, 18 STAN. L. REv. 475 (1968); 32 AM. TRIAL LAw. L.J. 350 (1968).
Arguments for and against the imposition of strict liability are treated in text
accompanying notes 133-135, infra.
I Kentucky is currently undergoing a judicial reorganization. The Kentucky Court
of Appeals is now the Supreme Court of Kentucky. Ky. REv. STAT. 21A.100 (Supp.
1976) [hereinafter cited as KRS]. All cases prior to Jan. 1, 1976 were decided by the
Kentucky Court of Appeals. After that date all references made to the highest appel-
late court in Kentucky are to the Supreme Court of Kentucky. Although both names,
Kentucky Court of Appeals and Supreme Court of Kentucky, are used in this paper,
they stand for the same Court.
'0 531 S.W.2d 493 (Ky. 1975), rehearing denied Feb. 6, 1976, cert. denied, 45
U.S.L.W. 3249 (U.S. Oct. 5, 1976)(No. 75-1596).
1 Id. at 501. Former Bad Faith Standard: Refusal to settle was of such "arbitrary
and reprehensible nature as to constitute bad faith, meaning conscious doing of a
wrong or breaching of a known duty for some motive of interest or ill will." Id. at 500.
Present Bad Faith Standard: "Did the insurer's failure to settle expose the insured to
an unreasonable risk of having a judgment rendered against him in excess of the policy
limits?" Id. at 501 (emphasis added).
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that excess liability issues are no longer triable before a jury.1 2
In order to determine the impact of this apparently unique
solution, it is necessary to analyze the Grundy decision in light
of the controversy which has arisen over the standard to which
an insurer should be held for refusal to settle '3 both within and
without Kentucky.
I. BACKGROUND
A. From Plain Meaning to a Bad Faith or Negligence
Standard
In the early 1900's courts assumed that the terms of insur-
ance policies were absolute and that absent contract terms
requiring a settlement, the insurer had no duty to settle." The
standard policy contained a provision similar to one included
in today's policies:
[T]he company shall have the right to make investigation,
negotiation, and settlement of any claim or suit as may be
deemed expedient by the company ...
[T]he insured shall not, except at his own cost, voluntarily
make any payment, assume any obligation or incur any ex-
pense other than [immediate medical relief].' 5
This clause was interpreted by its "plain meaning" just as
any other contractual language would be. If the insured lacked
12 Id. at 500. Apparently the complete determination of whether bad faith has
occurred will be left to the trial judge; however, the court did not state that no jury
will be assembled to assess other issues, such as damages.
,1 44 AM. JUR. 2d Insurance § 1530 (1969).
The confusion plaguing American jurists has not been limited to the differing
theories of liability. Although the law has generally conceded that the rights
of the insured 'go deeper than the mere surface of the insurance contract,'
the courts have experienced great difficulty in formulating a satisfactory and
consistent standard by which it may be determined whether the insurer's
failure to settle constitutes a breach of the liability insurance relationship.
See also Comment, Excess Liability Suits-The Mounting Need for Strict Liability,
13 ST. Louis U.L.J. 292, 299 (1968), quoting from Hilker v. Western Ins. Co., 231 N.W.
257, 258 (1930).
" Best Bldg. Co. v. Employer's Liability Ass. Corp., 160 N.E. 911 (N.Y. 1928);
Auerbach v. Maryland Cas. Co., 140 N.E. 577 (N.Y. 1923); Streat Coal Co. v. Frankfort
Gen. Ins. Co., 142 N.E. 352 (N.Y. 1923); Schmidt & Sons Brewing Co. v. Travelers'
Ins. Co., 90 A. 653 (Va. 1914).
" Radcliffe v. Franklin Nat'l Ins. Co., 298 P.2d 1002, 1005-06 (Ore. 1956).
[Vol. 65
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bargaining power, the courts were content to disregard that
fact and to find for the insurer on the basis of the plain meaning
of the contract. In most pre-1930 cases, the insured alleged an
absolute right to recover if the insurer had refused a settlement
within the policy limits. Usually the plaintiff-insured was un-
able to get his action for wrongful refusal to settle to a jury; his
complaint was dismissed because he alleged no negligence,
fraud, imposition, or bad faith on the part of the insurance
company." The prevailing view was that "it is not the duty of
the court to read into contracts conditions or limitations which
the parties have not assumed.'
' 7
Courts began to recognize that there might be a special
duty on the insurer to settle under certain circumstances. One
reason for this was probably social change.
The advent of the general use of the automobile and the
enormous increase in the number of liability policies of var-
ious kinds issued, coupled with the possibility of large ver-
dicts and serious injuries, increased the number of situations
in which attempts could be made and were made to collect
an amount in excess of policy limits.'
Moreover, plaintiff-insureds began to allege negligence, bad
faith, or both in their complaints rather than alleging an abso-
lute right to recover."9 The New Hampshire court in Douglas v.
United States Fidelity & Guaranty Co.,20 for example, accepted
a negligence standard. The test to be used was whether the
insurer had conducted himself'as an average person would in
" Streat Coal Co. v. Frankfort Gen. Ins. Co., 142 N.E. 352, 354 (N.Y. 1923); [The
complaint] "contains no allegations of any negligent act, fraud, imposition, or bad
faith on the part of the defendant." Id.
11 Id. at 355. However, authority to the contrary surfaced as early as 1911, see, e.g.,
Pfiester v. Missouri State Life Ins. Co., 116 P. 245 (Kan. 1911):
According to one view, the applicant and insurer are treated as if the negotia-
tions were of ordinary bargain and sale, in a field where both stand on the
same footing .... The other principal theory of the formulation of the insur-
ance contract is based upon facts .... Few persons solicited to take policies
understand the subject of insurance or the rules of law governing the negotia-
tions, and they have no voice in dictating the terms of what is called the
contract. Id. at 247.
'" Smith, Liability Beyond Policy Limits, 1946 INs. L.J. 130, 132.
" Noshey v. American Auto. Ins. Co., 68 F.2d 808 (6th Cir. 1934); City of Wake-
field v. Globe Indem. Co., 225 N.W. 643 (Mich. 1929).
- 127 A. 708 (N.H. 1924).
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carrying on negotiations for "settlement of his own business."'"
The court stated: "[Tihe fact that the right of election to
settle or to try the case is vested solely in the insurer does not
dispose of the present case. Exclusive authority to act does not
necessarily mean the right to act arbitrarily."2 A few other
courts were quick to follow the lead of the New Hampshire
court and to accept the same negligence standard.Y During the
1930's, in fact, the negligence standard was thought of as the
"modem" rule, and there was a trend towards its adoption.24
The negligence standard remains firmly embedded in a minor-
ity of jurisdictions today.
25
The majority of the courts rejected the negligence stan-
dard in favor of the bad faith standard.26 According to this
view, the insurer was liable to the insured for the excess judg-
ment only if the insurer refused a settlement offer because of
bad faith,2 defined as being tantamount to fraud.21 Courts felt
comfortable with this theory because even though the insur-
ance contract did not impose a duty to settle under any circum-
stance, fraud was a traditional ground for avoiding the specific
2 Id. at 710.
'Id.
2 E.g., G.A. Stowers Furn. Co. v. American Indem. Co., 15 S.W.2d 544, 548 (Tex.
1929), in which the insurer was held to "that degree of care and diligence which a man
of ordinary care and prudence would exercise in the management of his own business."
Id. The negligence jurisdictions find a duty to settle based upon a theory of agency.
The insurance company is looked upon as an exclusive agent for the insured, albeit
one with adverse interests, who is bound to give the rights of the insured at least as
much consideration as it does its own. Douglas v. United States Fidelity & Guar. Co.,
127 A. 708, 711 (N.H. 1924).
21 Appleman, Duty of Liability Insurer to Compromise Litigation, 26 Ky. L.J. 100
(1938).
25 See Bollinger v. Nuss, 449 P.2d 502 (Kan. 1969); Highway Ins. Underwriters v.
Lufkin-Beaumont Motor Coaches, Inc., 215 S.W.2d 904 (Tex. 1948). Although this
paper deals with the bad faith standard, there are problems with using the negligence
standard as well: "[W]hile the courts which have expressly adopted this rule are in
substantial agreement that the insurer's 'due care' in the circumstances is to be mea-
sured by that of a reasonably prudent man in the conduct of his own affairs, questions
have arisen whether the test should be the conduct of this hypothetical man in an
insured or uninsured status." 44 Am. JUR. 2d Insurance § 1530 (1969).
' Annot., 40 A.L.R.2d 178 (1955).
City of Wakefield v. Globe Indem. Co., 225 N.W. 643, 645 (Mich. 1929).
' See Noshey v. American Auto. Ins. Co., 68 F.2d 808, 810 (6th Cir. 1934); Georgia
Cas. Co. v. Mann, 46 S.W.2d 777, 778 (Ky. 1932); City of Wakefield v. Globe Indem.
Co., 225 N.W. 643, 644 (Mich. 1929).
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terms of the contract and granting contractual relief." In the
early decisions cases were often decided as a matter of law.3"
Because bad faith was looked on as being tantamount to fraud,
the standard of proof was that necessary to prove fraud 3 -the
evidence had to be clear, satisfactory, and convincing, a higher
standard than proof by a preponderence of the evidence.
2
Some jurisdictions did not demand this standard, however. In
these more liberal jurisdictions, if there were any evidence of
bad faith whatsoever, the issue was for the jury.
3
Hilker v. Western Automobile Insurance Co. 34 established
an agency theory to deal with bad faith.- Although the court
used bad faith language, recovery was held to be possible for
less than actual dishonesty or fraud on the part of the insurance
company. 6 The court considered the insurer an agent of the
insured because it had assumed complete control of the defense
of the action and of all settlement negotiations for its insured.
The court stated that since the interests of the two parties were
" "Prohibition against fraud or bad faith is imposed by law upon every legal
relationship, is a part of every lawful grant of power, and it is not necessary to contract
for it. The power to control settlements having been granted to insurer for the purpose
of its own protection under the policy, it is bound to use the power in good faith for
that purpose." City of Wakefield v. Globe Indem. Co., 225 N.W. 643, 644 (Mich. 1929);
see also Noshey v. American Auto. Ins. Co., 68 F.2d 808 (6th Cir. 1934); Georgia Cas.
Co. v. Mann, 46 S.W.2d 777 (Ky. 1932).
3' Noshey v. American Auto. Ins. Co., 68 F.2d 808 (6th Cir. 1934); Georgia Cas.
Co. v. Mann, 46 S.W.2d 777 (Ky. 1932); City of Wakefield v. Globe Indem. Co., 225
N.W. 643 (Mich. 1929).
31 While the word "fraud" is used interchangeably in courts of both law and
equity, an action for damages at common law based upon fraud, although not generally
referred to as such in the excess liability cases, is technically called an "action of
deceit." 37 AM. JuR. 2d Fraud and Deceit § 2 (1968). The elements necessary to prove
damages for such an action are: 1) False representation of a material fact; 2) scienter,
or knowledge on part of person making the representation that it was false; 3) intent
to deceive; 4) reliance on the misrepresentation by the person it was made to; and 5)
damages resulting from such reliance. PROSSER, TORTS § 105 (4th ed. 1971).
2 Berk v. Milwaukee Auto. Ins. Co., 15 N.W.2d 834, 838 (Wisc. 1944): "[F]raud
or bad faith must be established by evidence that is clear, satisfactory, and convinc-
ing."
3 E.g., City of Wakefield v. Globe Indem. Co., 225 N.W. 643, 646 (Mich. 1929):
"Where there is any evidence whatever of bad faith, the issue is for the jury." The
Michigan rule is considered to be the majority today. See Comment, Liability of
Insurer for Judgment in Excess of Policy Limits, 48 MIcH. L. REv. 95 (1949).
3 231 N.W. 257 (Wis. 1930). The jury verdict that insurer acted in bad faith
toward insured was affirmed. Id. at 261.
Id. at 260.
31 Id. at 260, 261.
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often adverse, the insurer's conduct would be subject to strict
scrutiny in order to determine whether it had acted in bad
faith.3 7 Characterizing the relationship between insurer and
insured as one of agency allowed the court to lessen the strict
requirements for finding fraud so that an insured had a greater
possibility of recovery.
38
B. Kentucky's History
In Georgia Casualty Co. v. Mann,39 Kentucky's first excess
liability suit, the complaint stated a cause of action in negli-
gence alone.4" The Court expressly rejected negligence as a
standard of recovery. It noted that the negligence standard was
predicated on an agency theory and that the insurance com-
pany is more than just an agent for its insured. There exists a
two-fold contractual relation on its part, one as insurer and the
other as agent of the insured. Thus, the company could look to
its own interests as well as to those of the insured." Although
the Court stated that it did not have to determine at that time
what facts would constitute bad faith, it remarked that cer-
tainly mere errors of judgment after the facts had been ascer-
tained were not bad faith:
Id. at 260.
"In view of the fact that these contracts of insurance are prepared by the
company and are not prescribed by law, the tendency of the decisions has been to
extend, rather than to circumscribe, the field of liability on the part of the com-
pany. . . ." Id. at 258. In Hilker, the court borrowed the theory of agency from the
negligence standard, and used it as a basis for finding bad faith. This case may be
the predecessor of those cases today which use an amalgamation of the bad faith and
negligence standards. The courts which use the dual standard, in which an insurer is
liable for bad faith or negligence, have recognized the confusion and difficulties in-
volved in deciding which standard to use. See, e.g., Zumwalt v. Utilities Ins. Co., 228
S.W.2d 750 (Mo. 1950); Burnham v. Commercial Cas. Ins. Co., 117 P.2d 644 (Wash.
1941). Perhaps these courts have the right idea since, although the bad faith standard
would appear to be the more restrictive of the two, "strangely enough, more verdicts
for plaintiffs [insureds] seem to emerge when the case is tried upon a bad faith theory
than upon a negligence theory." 7A J. APPLEMAN, INSURANcE LAW AND PRACTcE § 4712,
at 562 (2d ed. 1962).
31 46 S.W.2d 777 (Ky. 1932).
40 Id. Since the Mann case was the first excess liability case in Kentucky, there
was no standard yet. This case was decided in 1932, the time in which the negligence
standard was much discussed. Perhaps that is why the complaint only stated a cause
of action in negligence and not in bad faith as well.
41 Id.
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The gift of prophecy has never been bestowed on ordinary
mortals, and as yet their vision has not reached such a state
of perfection that they have the power to predict what will be
the verdict of the jury on disputed facts in a personal injury
case.
42
The theory of the action for bad faith refusal to settle was said
to be "based on a breach of the insurance contract and the
damages resulting therefrom. It is not in tort, and while the
specific language will not be found in the contract it is there
by operation of law. ' 43 The Kentucky courts adopted such a
theory, which had the effect of adding an implied covenant of
good faith and fair dealing to the insurance contract.4 4 Ken-
tucky decisions often stated that no satisfactory test for sub-
mitting the issue of bad faith to a jury had been formulated.45
The test for finding bad faith was synonymous with the defini-
tion of bad faith, which in the early cases was called simply
"the failure to exercise good faith. ' 4 Later, bad faith was said
to have no definite meaning but consisted of acts done "with
actual intent to mislead or deceive another. '4 Kentucky's
cases were indicative of those of strict bad faith jurisdictions;
in order to be liable for the excess judgment, the insurance
company's actions had to constitute fraud.48 Further, unlike
liberal bad faith jurisdictions, Kentucky maintained that a
higher than usual standard of proof was necessary to establish
12 Id. at 779. This was frequently quoted in later Kentucky opinions.
Terrell v. Western Cas. & Sur. Co., 427 S.W.2d 825, 827 (Ky. 1968).
Manchester Ins. & Indem. Co. v. Grundy, 531 S.W.2d 493, 498 (Ky. 1975),
quoting 3 WILUSTON, CONTRAcrS § 670 (rev. ed. 1936).
,1 American Sur. Co. v. J.F. Schneider & Son, 307 S.W. 2d 192, 195 (Ky. 1957);
Terrell v. Western Casualty & Sur. Co., 427 S.W.2d 825, 827 (Ky. 1968); Manchester
Ins. & Indem. Co. v. Grundy, 531 S.W. 2d 493, 498 (Ky. 1975), citing State Farm
Mutual Auto. Ins. Co. v. Marcum, 420 S.W.2d 113 (Ky. 1967) as illustrative of the
problem.
11 307 S.W.2d at 195; Georgia Cas. Co. v. Marcum, 46 S.W.2d 777, 780 (Ky. 1932).
17 Harrod v. Meridian Mutual Ins. Co., 389 S.W.2d 74, 76 (Ky. 1964), quoting
Spiegel v. Beacon Participations, Inc., 8 N.E.2d 895, 907 (Mass. 1937).
,1 The words "bad faith" and "fraud" are used interchangeably in pre-Grundy
decisions construing Kentucky law: Lemons v. State Auto. Mut. Ins. Co., 171 F. Supp.
92, 94 (E.D. Ky. 1954): "In Kentucky, the insured, or one claiming through him, in
order to recover a sum in excess of the provisions of the policy, is held to a high degree
of proof to show fraud or bad faith on the part of the insurance company." See also
Detenber v. American Univ. Ins. Co., 372 F.2d 50 (6th Cir. 1967)(Bad faith defined as
conscious doing of wrong).
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bad faith. 9 Kentucky's early case law laid the foundation for a
restrictive standard of recovery for the insured which was not
significantly altered in any respect until the Grundy decision.
11. CONFUSION IN THE COURTS TODAY
The diversity that developed over standards for recovery
in excess liability suits has not been reconciled. Instead, there
has been further controversy over the proper definition of the
bad faith standard and over the proper test to establish oppos-
ing parties' interests2 °
A. Standards-A Definitional Problem
Most courts still adhere to the bad faith standard.5 ' There
are wide variations in the definition of bad faith and in the
tests used to determine when it exists, however; any consisten-
cies between jurisdictions are the exception.2 Before Grundy,
for the insured to recover in Kentucky the insurer had to be
guilty of a conscious breach of duty to settle due to some ill will
or motive.53 Other strict bad faith jurisdictions define the
breach of duty as "an intentional disregard of the insured's
financial interest in the hope of escaping the responsibility
inherent in the policy."54 In other jurisdictions, as long as the
insurer does not act "capriciously" in refusing to settle, it has
satisfied the requirement of good faith.5 In still others, there
" Detenber v. American Univ. Ins. Co., 372 F.2d 50 (6th Cir. 1967), construing
Kentucky law; Lemons v. State Auto. Mut. Ins. Co., 171 F. Supp. 92, 94 (E.D. Ky.
1954), cited in State Farm Mutual Auto. Ins. Co. v. Marcum, 420 S.W.2d 113, 118 (Ky.
1967).
m See Annot., 40 A.L.R.2d 168 (1955), for a discussion of the confused state of law
in this regard. Courts use standards of negligence or bad faith or both with or without
combining these standards with certain tests. Many tests often include certain factors
such as whether or not the insured performed careful discovery methods. Other tests
do not set out any factors. Instead these ask whether the insurer adequately considered
the insured's interests. A few courts may use all these methods to arrive at a verdict.
Besides all this, a court may speak of the theory on which its bad faith or negligence
standard is founded. In short, most language used by courts adhering to the allegedly
identical standard is in great need of clarification.
1, Id. at 178.
52 See Keeton, supra note 2, at 1139 n.6.
"Manchester Ins. & Indem. Co. v. Grundy, 531 S.W.2d 493, 496 (Ky. 1975).
" Zumwalt v. Utilities Ins. Co., 228 S.W.2d 750, 754 (Mo. 1950).
" Cotton States Mut. Ins. Co. v. Fields, 128 S.E.2d 358, 359 (Ga. 1962).
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is no liability if the insurer has an honest belief or cause to
believe that any probable recovery would be less than the pol-
icy limits," while another jurisdiction holds that the standard
is satisfied if the insurer acts with both good faith and dili-
gence.57 These inconsistencies produce a lack of predictability
in the outcome of excess liability suits and confusion for insur-
ance companies as to how to conduct their businesses. As a
result of this confusion, insurance companies must frequently
be tempted to vie for a good position in the excess liability suit
which may follow the present tort claim rather than to attend
to its defense. This wastes time and increases costs, which are
reflected in higher premiums. 8
B. One Possible Test
Part of the variance in decisions between jurisdictions
which adhere to the bad faith standard is due to another incon-
sistency, the amount of consideration some courts require an
insurance company to give an insured's interests. Some com-
mentators consider this factor to be of greater importance than
the use of either a bad faith or negligence standard.59 Under the
early opinions the company was required to consider the inter-
ests of the insured, but not to the prejudice of its own inter-
ests. 0 This view is similar to the Kentucky requirement before
Grundy:6
So long as it acts in good faith, considering the interests of
the insured as well as its own, and not capriciously, an insurer
cannot be required to settle a case rather than litigate a
" Hodges v. Standard Acci. Ins. Co., 198 Cal. App.2d 546, 18 Cal. Rptr. 17, 23
(1962).
11 Southern Fire & Cas. Co. v. Norris, 250 S.W.2d 785, 792-93 (Tenn. 1951).
Keeton, supra note 2, at 1183.
5, See Cochran, The Obligation to Settle Within Policy Limits, 1970 INs. L.J. 583,
584: "[W]hether a court pays homage to the bad faith or negligence theory is of little
importance if it adheres to the rule requiring that paramount consideration be given
to one party's interests at the expense of the other." See also Keeton, supra note 2, at
1139 n.6.
Cochran, The Obligation to Settle Within Policy Limits, 1970 INs. L.J. 583, 584.
" State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Marcum, 420 S.W.2d 113 (Ky. 1967);
American Sur. Co. v. J. F. Schneider & Son, Inc., 307 S.W.2d 192 (Ky. 1957). The
Grundy decision did not address itself to this important issue.
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doubtful issue or bear the financial burden imposed on the
insured if ultimate liability should exceed the policy limit."
In a few jurisdictions the insurer may actually be required
to give more consideration to the insured's interests than to its
own where their interests conflict. 3 In most jurisdictions today,
however, the insurer has to give equal consideration to the
insured's interests." These last two requirements are methods
by which courts which adhere to the bad faith standard can
enable the insured to recover more readily.
C. Recent Trends-Placing Greater Responsibility on the
Insurer
Although most bad faith jurisdictions define bad faith as
something less than actual fraud, 5 the gradual liberalizing of
the bad faith standard reflects a willingness on the part of
many courts to place greater responsibility on the insurance
company. Some courts, in fact, now include negligence as a
factor to be considered along with other factors in determining
whether the insurer should be liable for the excess judgment."
11 American Sur. Co. v. J. F. Schneider & Son, Inc., 307 S.W.2d 192 (Ky. 1957).
The Court stated: "[W]hen the interests are in conflict, there is no duty to the insured
except that for which the insurer has expressly contracted." Id. at 195-96; Terrell v.
Western Cas. & Sur. Co., 427 S.W.2d 825, 828 (Ky. 1968). Kentucky is not the only
jurisdiction to use this somewhat dated concept. See, e.g., Farm Bureau Mut. Auto.
Ins. Co. v. Violano, 123 F.2d 692, 696 (2nd Cir. 1941).
" See Keeton, supra note 2, at 1145, to the effect that requiring the insurer to give
more consideration to the insured's interests than its own in fact results in strict
liability for the insurer.
11 Martin v. Travelers Indem. Co., 450 F.2d 542, 551 (5th Cir. 1971); Tennessee
Farmers Mut. Insur. Co. v. Wood, 277 F.2d 21, 24 (6th Cir. 1960); Hamilton v. State
Farm Ins. Co., 523 P.2d 193, 196, 198 (Wash. 1974). One test used to determine whether
the insurer has given equal consideration to the insured's interests in the determination
of whether to settle within policy limits is whether the insurer conducted himself as if
the insured had no policy limits, 523 P.2d 193, 196 (Wash. 1974).
American Fidelity & Cas. Co. v. Greyhound Corp., 258 F.2d 709 (5th Cir. 1958),
construing Florida law; Hamilton v. State Farm Ins. Co., 523 P.2d 193, 196 (Wash.
1974).
11 For cases which use negligence as a factor to be considered see St. Paul-Mercury
Indem. Co. v. Martin, 190 F.2d 455 (10th Cir. 1951); Davy v. Public Nat. Ins. Co., 5
Cal. Rptr. 488 (Cal. App. 1960); Auto. Mut. Indem. Co. v. Shaw, 184 So. 852 (Fla.
1938). For examples of cases in other jurisdictions which use factors as an aid in
determining an insurer's liability, see Jessen v. O'Daniel, 210 F. Supp. 317 (D. Mont.
1962); Bollinger v. Nuss, 449 P.2d 502 (Kan. 1969); Manchester Ins. & Indem. Co. v.
Grundy, 531 S.W.2d 493, 499-500 (Ky. 1975).
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Most jurisdictions which consider the degree of interest which
an insurer should give its insured, however, now use an equal
consideration standard. 7 These courts have recognized that an
insurer has a responsibility to accept a reasonable settlement
offer within policy limits rather than subject the insured to the
risk of having to pay a possible excess judgment.
8
Other courts have not been content with even this liberali-
zation and have come close to adopting a strict liability stan-
dard. 9 Florida, for example, is supposedly a bad faith jurisdic-
tion. Under its interpretation of bad faith, however, the insurer
must consider the interests of the insured equally with its own
interests, 0 and it is not necessary to prove constructive or ac-
tual fraud. 71 Further, negligence is a factor to be considered in
weighing whether there has been a breach of good faith.72 In
National Indemnity Co. v. Donald,73 in which the appellate
court affirmed per curiam the trial court's verdict against the
insurer for bad faith refusal to settle, the dissenting judge wrote
that the facts indicated neither bad faith nor negligence by the
insurance company in its handling of the insurer's claim: "The
verdict in the present action rests on nothing more than the
fact that an excess verdict was rendered [in the original tort
suit in which the insurer rejected an offer to settle]. This of
course is not the criterion for liability.
74
" The "equal interests" degree of consideration is used most frequently and is
urged by commentators as being the most equitable. See Keeton, supra note 2, at 1145;
Note, Excess Liability Suits, 13 ST. Louis U.L.J. 292, 304 (1968).
Note, Insurer's Refusal to Settle, 60 YALE L.J. 1037, 1041 (1951).
" See, e.g., Crisci v. Security Ins. Co., 426 P.2d 173, 58 Cal. Rptr. 13 (1967);
National Indem. Co. v. Donald, 229 So. 2d 900 (Fla. 1969).
78 Comment, Insurance: Strict Liability for Insurance Companies in Excess Judg-
ment Suits, 23 U. FLA. L. REv. 201, 202 (1970).
", Id. at 203.
72 Id.
13 229 So. 2d 900 (Fla. 1969), per curiam opinion by District Court of Appeals of
Florida.
1 Id. at 903, Reed, J., dissenting. "The present case [Donald] indicated that
Florida courts seem bent on continuing the trend toward greater responsibility of
insurance companies by abandoning the bad faith standard and moving toward strict
liability." Comment, Insurance: Strict Liability for Insurance Companies in Excess
Judgment Suits, 23 U. FLA. L. REv. 201, 206 (1970). The point that Judge Reed makes
in his dissent is that courts are not at liberty to abandon the bad faith standard
because the written terms of insurance contracts expressly give the insurer the right
to make such settlement of claims as it deems expedient. Many judges adhere to this
more restrictive view.
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California, well-known for its pro-insured attitude,75 has
developed the most obvious and influential attempts at judge-
made reforms in insurance contracts.76 In the frequently cited
case of Crisci v. Security Insurance Co., 77 the court suggested
that it might be appropriate to adopt strict liability for excess
liability suits although such an extension was not then neces-
sary under the facts. In its discussion of the merits of adopting
strict liability,the court stated:
Finally, and most importantly, there is more than a small
amount of elementary justice in a rule that would require
that, in this situation where the insurer's and insured's inter-
ests necessarily conflict, the insurer, which may reap the ben-
efits of its determination not to settle, should also suffer the
detriments of its decision.
Even though California has not yet adopted a strict liability
standard, 7  Crisci stands for "the culmination of a social
trend-an effort on the part of the court to bend its substantive
law and rules to comply with the changing times." 0
III. A CLOSER LOOK AT KENTUCKY LAW-THE GRUNDY
DECISION
A. Change in the Bad Faith Standard
Prior to the Grundy decision, Kentucky courts had been
among the most restrictive in allowing recovery. Kentucky
originally chose the bad faith standard and rejected negli-
gence," demanding a high standard of proof, similar to a clear
15 Out of over a dozen cases at the appellate level, the insurer has succeeded in
only one. Sackville, Duty of Insurer to Settle Within the Policy Limits, 1968 UTAH L.
REv. 72, at 99 n.120.
11 Silberg v. California Life Ins. Co., 521 P.2d 1103, 113 Cal. Rptr. 711 (1974);
Crisci v. Security Ins. Co., 426 P.2d 173, 58 Cal. Rptr. 13 (1967); Comunale v. Traders
& Gen. Ins. Co., 328 P.2d 198 (Cal. 1958) (insurer who denies coverage does so at his
own risk).
77 426 P.2d 173, 58 Cal. Rptr. 13 (1967). Test: Whether a prudent insurer without
policy limits would have accepted the settlement offer. In Crisci, the court also allowed
damages for mental suffering, Id. at 179, 58 Cal. Rptr. at 15.
Id. at 177, 58 Cal. Rptr. at 17; quoted in Grundy at 499.
7, See Johansen v. California State Auto Assoc., 116 Cal. Rptr. 546 (Cal. App.
1974), in which a theory of strict liability was pleaded and refuted.
Snow, Excess Liability-Crisci & Lysick, 36 INs. COUNSEL J. 51 (1969).
" State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Marcum, 420 S.W.2d 113, 118 (Ky. 1967);
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and convincing standard, with the result that the issue of bad
faith was frequently decided as a question of law.12 Kentucky
courts also stated that the insurer is only required to give
"some consideration" to the insured's interests," and used an
early definition of bad faith as a "conscious doing of wrong or
breaching of a known duty for some motive of interest or ill
will." This view of bad faith, as nearly tantamount to fraud,
was used and repeated in Kentucky even at the trial level of
the Grundy case, 5 although it was severely criticized for its
lack of responsiveness to the needs of the insured. 8
The decision of the Supreme Court in Grundy was an at-
tempt to clarify the language used in expressing the bad faith
standard, which had been confused in previous Kentucky deci-
sions. 7 Not only did the Court find a wide variety of definitions
used in Kentucky cases, it also found that the bad faith stan-
dard as set up by the trial court in Grundy was unsatisfactoryss
Georgia Cas. Co. v. Mann, 46 S.W.2d 777, 780 (Ky. 1932).
11 Five out of seven cases from Kentucky have decided the insurer's liability as a
matter of law, by summary judgment, or by reversal on appeal in favor of the insurer:
Manchester Ins. & Indem. Co. v. Grundy, 531 S.W.2d 493 (Ky. 1975) (jury verdict for
insured reversed with new trial granted); Harvin v. United States Fidelity & Guar.
Co., 428 S.W.2d 213 (Ky. 1968) (summary judgment in favor of insurer affirmed);
Terrell v. Western Cas. & Sur. Co., 427 S.W.2d 825 (Ky. 1968) (summary judgment
for insurer reversed in part because defendant in tort suit had admitted liability);
State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Marcum, 420 S.W.2d 113 (Ky. 1967)(jury verdict
for insured upheld); Harrod v. Meridian Mut. Insur. Co., 389 S.W.2d 74 (Ky.
1964)(trial court's determination that as a matter of law, there was no issue of bad faith
affirmed); American Sur. Co. & Son v. J.F. Schneider, 307 S.W.2d 192 (Ky. 1957) (jury
verdict for insured reversed); Georgia Cas. Co. v. Mann, 46 S.W.2d 777 (Ky. 1932) (jury
verdict for insured reversed).
0 See American Sur. Co. v. J. F. Schneider & Son, 307 S.W.2d 192, 195 (Ky.
1957).
" Manchester Ins. & Indem. Co. v. Grundy, 531 S.W.2d 493, 496 (Ky. 1975).
531 S.W.2d at 496 (Ky. 1975).
" "Even now, some judges are unable to penetrate through the mist of orthodoxy
into the realities of the problem, so that occasionally a poor decision will be reached
on the basis of clearly outmoded and inappropriate reasoning." Sackville, supra note
5, at 99, citing Harrod v. Meridian Mut. Ins. Co., 389 S.W.2d 74, 76 (Ky. 1964).
" See note 82, supra; see also the federal cases based on Kentucky law: Detenber
v. American Universal Ins. Co., 372 F.2d 50 (6th Cir. 1967) (insurer's motion for
summary judgment sustained); Noshey v. American Auto. Ins. Co., 68 F.2d 808 (6th
Cir. 1934)(complaint stated valid cause of action sufficient to go to jury against in-
sured); Lemons v. State Auto. Mut. Ins. Co., 171 F. Supp. 92 (E.D. Ky. 1959) (com-
plaint stated valid cause of action against insurer).
11 531 S.W.2d at 500. The Court cited State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Marcum,
420 S.W.2d 113 (Ky. 1967), in pointing out the difficulty of formulating a satisfactory
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Although the Court noted that no satisfactory standard was
available, it decided to overrule its restrictive standard of bad
faith as being "more rhetorical than practical in application."89
The Court then discussed Crisci and the trend towards strict
liability, but rejected this theory in spite of its simplicity be-
cause it "reforms the insurance contract.""Instead the Court
adopted a new standard of bad faith:
Did the insurer's failure to settle expose the insured to an
unreasonable risk of having a judgment rendered against
him in excess of the policy limits? If the question is answered
"yes" by the trial court after weighing and evaluating the
various factors, then the insurer is guilty of "bad faith."'"
The Court then outlined the factors to be used in applying the
definition: (1) the, probability that recovery in the original tort
suit would be in excess of the policy limits;92 (2) whether there
were negotiations with respect to settlement with last-minute
offers to settle being given less weight; and (3) whether the
insured made a demand on the insurer to settle. 3 The new
standard plus the factors to be considered set up a test for bad
faith in excess liability suits in Kentucky.
B. Taking the Excess Liability Issue from the Jury
The Supreme Court did more than renovate Kentucky's
version of the bad faith standard; it also removed excess liabil-
ity issues from the jury,94 stating in Grundy that frustration
standard. 531 S.W.2d at 498.
" 531 S.W.2d at 500.
Id. at 499. Although the Court did not explain its reasoning, apparently it
believed that the insurance contract would be "reformed" because the parties did not
bargain for a contract that would insure payment of an excess judgment in case of an
excess verdict.
' Id. at 501.
92 531 S.W.2d at 499-500. This factor is of primary importance. The Court added
that to the extent the probable amount of recovery increases beyond policy limits, so
does the burden on the insurer to settle. This is suggested in 44 AM. JUR. 2d Insurance
§ 1531, at 409.
," 531 S.W.2d at 499-500. While of some value this factor is not controlling. For
examples of other cases which use factors, see note 66, supra; JAagrr, supra note 6,
at 63-65, lists factors to consider. A notable factor which is absent from the Kentucky
list is whether the insurer has properly investigated so as to enable him to evaluate
the case correctly. The absence of this factor may indicate an unwillingness on the part
of the Court to extend its new decision to benefit the insured significantly.
" 531 S.W.2d at 500:
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and confusion over the proper standard to which the insurer
must be held arise because the tests used are too difficult for a
jury to apply."
Use of a jury in excess liability cases has often been criti-
cized,9" but taking all issues of bad faith from the jury appears
unprecedented. The Court believed that a trial judge has the
necessary training and experience which a jury lacks to deter-
mine whether an insurance company should have accepted a
settlement offer. 7 If one accepts this basic premise, the Grundy
decision could prove to be a practical remedy for the troubled
area of bad faith refusal to settle since it presents a workable
definition of bad faith coupled with the assurance that the test
will be fairly and properly applied.
C. An Analysis of the Decision
1. The New Standard
The new standard for determining bad faith is certainly
more clear than the old, if only because the Court finally de-
leted the subjective terms of "good" or "bad" faith. The elu-
siveness of these terms had been mentioned in an earlier case:
Bad faith is a general and somewhat indefinite term. It has
no constricted meaning. It cannot be defined with exactness.
It is not simply bad judgment. It is not merely negligence.98
We are of the opinion that a jury is just not equipped to evaluate the prob-
able chances of recovery in a given case; nor is it equipped to properly weigh
and evaluate this factor together with the other factors enumerated above.
The issue of "bad faith" should be decided by the trial court. Only the trial
court has the training and experience to properly apply these factors to a set
of facts.
"1 Id.: "Ordinarily a jury is unsurpassed as a fact-finding body for disputed facts.
However, if we assign to the jury tasks which it cannot perf6rm intelligently, we are
destroying the efficacy of the prepounded test."
" E.g., Appleman, Duty of Liability Insurer to Compromise Litigation, 26 Ky.
L.J. 100, 110 (1938); Comment, Insurance: Strict Liability for Insurance Companies
in Excess Judgment Suits, 23 U. FLA. L. Rav. 201 (1970). The Kentucky Supreme
Court cited these articles in Grundy, at 499, 500. It failed to point out that although
Appleman is critical of determination of excess liability cases by juries, he is also
concerned that trial judges are no better equipped to decide the matter. Appleman's
conclusion is that the question of liability in these cases should be decided as a matter
of law whenever possible; he does not conclude that the issue of bad faith should be
taken from the jury in every case. Appleman, at 111.
, 531 S.W.2d at 500.
" State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Marcum, 420 S.W.2d 113, 121 (Ky. 1967)
1976]
KENTUCKY LAW JOURNAL
Setting out the factors to be considered lends still more clarity
to the new definition and should be helpful in guiding the
insurer's conduct and in deciding excess liability suits.
The "unreasonable risk" standard developed in Grundy
can best be evaluated by determining what changes, if any, will
result from abandoning the former standard, which, as pre-
viously noted, was favorable to the insurer in all aspects. Al-
though the Court once again rejected the negligence theory as
the basis for the new standard,99 the words "unreasonable risk"
smack of a more objective, tort-oriented definition. Moreover,
since the new standard no longer defines bad faith as a type of
fraud, the elements of the case should be easier to prove and
there should no longer be a high standard of proof required.
Theoretically this should mean that fewer insureds will be sub-
ject to summary judgments or directed verdicts against them,
with fewer cases decided as a matter of law. ' Since there is no
longer a requirement of "moral obliquity" or "ill will," the
insured should be able to recover even where the insurer has
acted without actual misrepresentation or wrongdoing."' '
The Court did not address itself to how much considera-
tion the insurer must give to the interests of the insured.
0 2
Formerly, the insurer had to give the insured's interests "only
some consideration. '"103 The insurer may be able to evade the
more rigorous new test simply by stating that he has completed
this requirement. On the other hand, this argument may be
outweighed by the fact that the new standard clearly focuses
upon the risk to which the insurance company is subjecting the
insured, as opposed to the old standard which merely focused
on the moral nature of the conduct of the insurer.
There will be practical difficulties in applying the new
quoting Spiegel v. Beacon Participations, Inc., 8 N.E.2d 895, 907 (Mass. 1937).
" 531 S.W.2d at 497. The theory behind the new test remains breach of the good
faith implied in any contractual relation. The important practical implication of this
is that no punitive damages will be available. Punitive damages have been awarded
for wrongful refusal to settle based on a theory of tort, see, e.g., State Farm Mut. Auto.
Ins. Co. v. Smoot, 381 F.2d 331, 338 (5th Cir. 1967).
" See note 82, supra.
,' This meets the criticism of former Kentucky decisions, see note 86, supra.
112 See text accompanying notes 63-65, supra. Some commentators believe this
test of critical importance.
11 See text accompanying note 62, supra.
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test, of course. It is a complete break with pre-existing Ken-
tucky law and the Court cited no cases which have similar
standards. 14 Thus, it will be difficult to develop a theoretical
framework within which to base the facts of excess liability
cases until case law under Grundy has been established.
In contrast to its practical difficulties, the Grundy test
should be of benefit to Kentucky law since it presents a clear,
fairly objective definition of bad faith along with a practical list
of factors to use as a test for the new standard. Because the new
standard should enable insureds to recover on their excess lia-
bility suits more easily, it may force insurance companies to be
more careful in handling the original tort suit for their custom-
ers. Further, insurance companies should be more willing to
settle should the facts indicate that a jury might award an
amount over the policy limits. Finally, the Grundy standard
should give insurers a clearer idea of how to base their conduct
and should lend greater predictability to the outcome of excess
liability suits.
2. Taking the Excess Liability Issue from the Jury
a- Rationale
In the Court's opinion, its decision to remove excess liabil-
ity cases from the jury has the "no-jury" advantage of strict
liability, 05 but does not have what it considers the main disad-
vantage of strict liability, reformation of the insurance con-
tract.0 ' The Grundy Court failed to analyze why a jury would
' For a similar standard, see Comunale v. Traders & Gen. Ins. Co., 328 P.2d 198,
201 (Cal. 1958): "When there is a great risk of recovery beyond policy limits so that
the most reasonable manner of disposing of the claim is a settlement which can be
made within those limits, a consideration in good faith of the insured's interests re-
quires the insurer to settle the claim." (Ironically, California is probably the most pro-
insured jurisdiction in the country, see notes 68-69, supra.) For another somewhat
similar standard, see Martin v. Travelers Indem. Co., 450 F.2d 542 (5th Cir. 1971).
I" Advocates of strict liability have often listed the no-jury aspects of the strict
liability rule as an advantage. For a list of commentators advocating strict liability,
see note 7, supra.
,0 531 S.W.2d at 499: "The advantage of strict liability is in its simplicity. The
objection in our view is that it reforms the insurance contract." Since there are no
terms in the contract to the effect that the insurer has a duty to settle under any
circumstances, many courts feel they cannot rewrite the terms for the parties as drasti-
cally as an adoption of the strict liability rule would require. Under classic contractual
theory, the analysis would be that the parties have not bargained for payment of the
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not be necessary if strict liability were adopted. Under that
standard there would no longer be questions of fact as to
whether bad faith or negligence had occurred. The insurer
would be liable for the excess as a matter of law, as long as
there had been an offer to settle. The only issue of fact for a
jury to determine under a strict liability standard would be
whether, in fact, a bona fide settlement offer had been made.
0 7
Kentucky's new standard for determining bad faith, whether
"the insurer's failure to settle exposed the insured to an unrea-
sonable risk of having a judgment rendered against him in
excess of the policy limits,"' 1 8 does not eradicate the main is-
sues of fact as would a standard of strict liability. The only
change the Court made was to switch the determination of the
factual issue of whether the insurer acted in bad faith from the
jury to the trial judge, who is arguably no better qualified than
a jury to decide that issue."9 Studies indicate that juries do, by
and large, get the facts straight."' Thus, if the decision to re-
move excess liability cases from the jury were made to insure
excess judgment by the insurance company any time such judgment results from a
refusal to settle.
107 See Comment, Insurance-Liability of Insurer for Judgment in Excess of Policy
Limits, 48 MICH. L. REv. 95 (1949).
IM 531 S.W.2d at 501.
, See Appleman, supra note 96, at 110. Judges, of course, always decide questions
of law. Here the judge is also being asked to decide questions of fact, normally the
function of the jury.
1,* H. KALVEN & H. ZEISEL, THE AMERICAN JURY 149 (1966). Query whether this
study is exacting enough to settle the question.
That the Court does not strongly favor the insured seems to be apparent by their
remark that "[alt the time of the trial on the issue of liability [i.e., the original trial
of the insured's liability in Grundy], there had never been a recovery by the insured
or his assignee upheld by this court." 531 S.W.2d at 497. Thus, the Court may have
had a further, albeit unexpressed, reason for taking the excess liability case from the
jury, concern for jury bias in favor of the insured. Most of those who suspect jury bias
are, not surprisingly, on the insurance side of the law suit: "The real danger in all these
cases is that juries are prone to be most . . . sympathetic with the plaintiff-insured
(or his judgment creditor assignee) who presents a pathetic and destitute
position. . . . [The] jury is not likely to consider the decision of the jury in the
original . . . case as erroneous or unsound." JARRE'r, supra note 6, at 62-63. In fact,
one insurance counsel believed that the only solution to the excess liability crisis was
to "settle the damage suit reasonably or try it in such a way as to avoid a subsequent
suit ever reaching the hands of a jury." Austin & Locke, Handling the Excess Coverage
Situation for the Insurer, 36 INs. COUNSEL L.J. 60, 68 (1969); see also Huttenbrauck,
Effect of Insured's Bad Faith Refusal to Settle on Insurer's Liability for Excess
Judgment, 7 THE FORUM 61 (1972).
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that the test is properly applied or to obtain greater uniformity
of decisions, it may have been a futile holding. Justice Clayton
touched on these criticisms in his dissent:
I cannot agree that a trial judge, even though trained in legal
principles, is better qualified than a jury of twelve properly
instructed individuals in (1) resolving issues of fact, (2) gaug-
ing the actions of an insurance company, and (3) answering
the ultimate question of whether bad faith is present ...
, . . Today juries are sufficiently sophisticated in the field
of insurance to adequately find from the facts if an insurance
company has acted in bad faith."'
b. A Question of Constitutionality
One further objection to the Court's decision is whether it
is constitutional to take excess liability issues from the jury."2
In Kentucky there is a constitutional right to trial by jury on
legal issues (as opposed to equitable issues which are tradition-
ally for the court) if such right "heretobefore existed," that is,
existed prior to the framing of the Kentucky Constitution.,3 In
addition, Rule 39.01 of the Kentucky Rules of Civil Procedure
determines when a right to jury trial exists."' This rule was
taken directly from Rule 39 of the Federal Rules of Civil Proce-
dure,' ' with one crucial difference: Kentucky's rule includes a
' 531 S.W.2d at 501.
11 The question of whether an excess liability suit should be tried by a jury was
presented in Douglas v. United States Fid. & Guar. Co., 127 A. 708, 710 (N.H. 1924).
When the insurer questioned the ability of jurors to comprehend such a case, the court
replied that this was not reason enough to take the case from the jury.
"I See 7 CLAY, KENTUCKY PRAcricE 6-7. The Kentucky Constitution states: "§ 7.
Right of Trial by Jury-The ancient mode of trial by jury shall be held sacred, and
the right thereof remain inviolate, subject to such modifications as may be authorized
by this Constitution." Ky. R. Civ. P. [hereinafter cited as CR] 38.01 states: "The
right of trial by jury as declared by the Constitution of Kentucky or as given by a
statute of Kentucky shall be preserved to the parties inviolate."
'" 7 CLAY, KENTUCKY PRAcricE 16 (CR 39.01(3)).
22 FED. R. Civ. P. 39. Trial by Jury or by the Court. (a) By Jury.
When trial by jury has been demanded as provided for in Rule 38, the action
shall be designated upon the docket as a jury action. The trial of all issues
so demanded shall be by jury, unless (1) the parties or their attorneys of
record, by written stipulation filed with the court or by an oral stipulation
made in open court and entered in the record, consent to trial by the court
sitting without a jury or (2) the court upon motion or of its own initiative
finds that a right of trial by jury of some or all of those issues does not exist
under the Constitution or statutes of the United States.
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"complicated facts" exception to the right to trial by jury."6
The source of this exception, which permits a judge to remove
a case from the province of the jury if he finds that because
there are "peculiar questions involved," "complicated ac-
counts," or "a great detail of facts" a jury could not intelli-
gently decide the issues," 7 is from an 1890 amendment to
Section 10 of the Civil Code of Practice (Civil Code § 10(4)).1 8
The Court in Grundy may have based its decision to re-
move the excess liability fact determinations from the jury on
the "great detail of facts" exception of Rule 39.01(3)."' How-
ever, Rule 39.01(3) has recently been attacked as unconstitu-
tional under the Kentucky Constitution.2 0 There is no quarrel
over the constitutional aspects of the "complicated accounts"
"I The addition is CR 39.01(3): "the court upon motion or of its own initiative
finds that because of the peculiar questions involved, or because the action involves
complicated accounts, or a great detail of facts, it is impracticable for a jury intelli-
gently to try the case."
The dubious constitutionality of the "complicated facts" exception to the right to
trial by jury in Kentucky is the thesis of a recent article. For a much broader treatment
of the subject than can be given here, see Sower, "Complicated Issues" v. The Right
to a Jury Trial: A Procedural Remnant in Kentucky Law Raises Constitutional
Problems, 3 N. Ky. L.R. 173 (1976).
117 CR 39.01(3).
"' "[Tihe court may, in its discretion, on motion of either party, or without
motion, order the transfer of an action from the ordinary to the equity docket, or from
a court of purely common law to a court of purely equity jurisdiction, whenever the
court, before which the action is pending, shall be of the opinion that such transfer is
necessary because of the peculiar questions involved or because the case involves
accounts so complicated, or such great detail of facts, as to render it impracticable for
a jury to intelligently try the case." Act of April 29, 1890, ch. 1095 §§ 1, 2, 1 AcTs OF
GENERAL ASSEMBLY OF Ky. 115, (codified in Civil Code 10(4)[hereinafter cited as
CC])(emphasis added). See Sower, supra note 116, at 175-79.
"' 531 S.W.2d at 500. Although the Court cites no authority for its decision to
remove this class of cases from the jury, its reason to do so is that the facts involved
are too complex. Thus, the "great detail of facts" exception to the usual right to jury
trial in a contract case would be applicable.
Im An accounting action is an adjustment of the accounts of the parties and a
rendering of judgment for the balance due. 1 Am. JuR. 2d Accounts & Accounting § 44
(1962). Basically, the attack argues that § 7 of the Ky. CONST. has been interpreted
by the Kentucky Supreme Court as guaranteeing trial by jury as it existed at common
law, see Johnson v. Holbrook, 302 S.W.2d 608, 610-11 (Ky. 1957); Commercial Union
Assur. Co. v. Howard, 76 S.W.2d 246, 248 (Ky. 1934). Jury trials were customarily
denied in a complicated accounting action at common law even where legal issues were
present, so this section of CR 39.01(3) would be constitutional. However, at common
law, jury trials were not denied simply because of "peculiar questions" or "great detail
of facts." Thus, CR 39.01(3) should be rewritten or struck down in its entirety, see
Sower, supra note 116, at 178, 183-87.
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section of Kentucky Civil Rule of Procedure 39.01(3).121 The
existing conflict, which has been touched on in Kentucky case
law, concerns the validity of the additional exceptions, the
"peculiar questions" and "great detail of facts," to the right to
jury trial.'22 Some Kentucky decisions have cited the additional
exceptions to deny the right to jury trial on legal issues other
than those of "complicated accounts."'2 On the other hand,
certain Kentucky decisions hold that the denial of a jury trial
because of "great detail of facts" is improper. "[T]he fact that
a great mass of evidence or a great number of witnesses is
necessary to prove a legal issue does not necessarily convert the
suit into one of an equitable nature.'
'2 4
Even if Rule 39.01(3) is determined to be constitutional,
its application in Grundy may well be improper. CR 39.01(3)
is a condensed version of Civil Code § 10(4).125 The wording of
Civil Code § 10(4) appears to allow the trial court to transfer
cases from law to equity on a case-by-case basis. The Grundy
decision removes the entire class of excess liability cases from
the jury, not on an individual case determination made by a
trial judge, but through the decision of the reviewing court.'2 6
12 In fact, the question of the constitutionality of Civil Code § 10(4), former CR
39.01(3), was squarely before the Court in O'Connor & McCalloch v. Henderson Bridge
Co., 27 S.W. 251, rehearing denied, 27 S.W. 983 (1894). The Court upheld the portion
of the rule which pertained to "complicated accounts"; the other two exceptions, those
of "peculiar questions" and "great detail of facts," were not addressed in the case. See
Sower, supra note 116, at 179-80.
"'2 Sower, supra note 116, at 184-85.
" See, e.g., Hoaglin v. Carrs Adm'x, 294 S.W.2d 935 (Ky. 1956); Reusch v. Hem-
mer, 33 S.W.2d 618 (Ky. 1930). See also Sower, supra note 116, at 180-83.
22 Shatz v. American Surety Co., 295 S.W.2d 809, 812 (Ky. 1955). See also Bran-
denburg v. Burns, 451 S.W.2d 413 (Ky. 1970); Carder & Vallandingham v. Weiseng-
burg, 23 S.W. 964 (Ky. 1893). In Weisengburg the Court stated: "The right of trial by
jury, as secured to the citizen under the constitution of the state, cannot be taken
away, or placed at the discretion of the Chancellor, by converting a legal right into
an equitable one." 23 S.W. at 964. See also Sower, supra note 116, at 185-86.
2 See Sower, supra note 116, at 177, for further information about the source of
CR 39.01(3).
" See emphasized portions of CC 10(4), supra note 118. The language never
indicates that all cases of a certain type may be removed from the jury by the appellate
court. Also, the language never refers to "case" in the plural nor does it speak in terms
of an appellate court being able to make the decision to transfer the case from law to
equity. Moreover, there do not appear to be Kentucky cases at common law, that is,
those in existence prior to CC § 10(4), in which the appellate court removed cases from
the jury without an individual case-by-case review.
In House v. Kellerman, 519 S.W.2d 380 (Ky. 1975), the Court took the issue of
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The Supreme Court's proper role should be to review whether
the trial court's decision to transfer factual issues from jury to
judge was correct, not to decide de novo to remove factual
issues from a jury;'2 nor should the Court be able to remove
cases or issues prospectively rather than on an individual case
basis.
The American Trial Lawyers Association believed the de-
cision in Grundy important enough to file an amicus curiae
brief on motion for rehearing. 28 The brief presented two main
arguments: (1) That Grundy was unconstitutional under the
equal protection and due process clauses of the fourteenth
amendment to the United States Constitution, 9 and (2) that
intervening cause from the jury on a class rather than on an individual case basis. The
Court also noted: "[Tihere is much to be said for the proposition that basic causation
itself should be treated as a question of law, the jury deciding only the issues of
negligence." Id. at 382 n.2. Query whether the decisions in Grundy and House simply
reflect the way a particular court views the jury system. For a discussion of House v.
Kellerman, see Comment, House v. Kellerman: Judge, Jury, and Intervening Cause,
64 Ky. L.J. 889 (1976).
"' Except for the House and Grundy decisions, most cases reflect that the Court
has restricted itself to its proper role of reviewing whether the trial court's removal of
the cases from law to equity was correct. See, e.g.., Brandenburg v. Bums, 451 S.W.2d
413 (Ky. 1970); City of Shively v. Hyde, 438 S.W.2d 512 (Ky. 1969); McGuire v.
Hammond, 405 S.W.2d 191 (Ky. 1966); Coy v. King, 250 S.W. 503 (Ky. 1923).
"I See Brief for Grundy as Amicus Curiae, Manchester Ins. & Indem. Co. v.
Grundy, 531 S.W.2d 493 (Ky. 1975), on motion for rehearing (motion denied Feb. 6,
1976).
I" The opinion of the Court holds that the right to trial by jury in a particu-
lar type of civil action may be denied solely on the basis of the complexity
of the issues and the difficulty of applying a particular legal test to a particu-
lar set of facts. This Court has thereby sought to deny the right to jury trial
to a sub-class of litigants within a larger category consisting of parties to legal
actions for breach of contract. . . . [T]here is no valid basis
for distinguishing this present action for damages from any other such action
at law, and the Court's separation of insurance company defendants and
plaintiffs claiming bad faith failure to settle, from other such litigants in
contract action bears no reasonable relationship to the object of the lawsuit,
namely, the recovery of damages. Such a holding violates the guarantees of
due process of law and equal protection of the law secured to all citizens by
the fifth and fourteenth amendments to the Constitution of the United
States. Id. at 2-3.
This is the basic issue the petition for certiorari filed May 3, 1976, presented to the
United States Supreme Court, see 45 U.S.L.W. 3070 (U.S. July 27, 1976) (No. 75-
1596), cert. denied, 45 U.S.L.W. 3249 (U.S. Oct. 5, 1976). Note that the federally
guaranteed right to trial by jury in civil cases has not been incorporated into the
fourteenth amendment so that no federal constitutional right to trial by jury has been
extended to the states in civil cases. However, Kentucky does endorse the federal
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the removal of excess liability cases from the jury was unconsti-
tutional under the Kentucky Constitution as interpreted by
Kentucky case law.'
30
Thus, the decision in Grundy to remove all excess liability
cases from the jury can be attacked as constitutionally defi-
cient in at least three ways. First, that the "great detail of
facts" or "peculiar questions" exception to a right to jury trial
upon which the Grundy decision may be based is unconstitu-
tional. Second, that the Court's recent use of the exception in
Rule 39.01(3) allowing the Court to remove entire classes of
cases from the jury as opposed to the trial court using the
exception on a case-by-case basis is unconstitutional. And fi-
nally, that the denial of jury trials in all excess liability cases
may be federally unconstitutional.
At best, taking the issue of bad faith from the jury may
insure that the new test will be comprehended and properly
applied. On the other hand, no other jurisdiction has taken
such a step. The decision was probably unnecessary since the
standard has now been clarified, and there is no proof that
removing the bad faith issue from the jury will insure greater
predictability of decisions or less bias in decisions. Above all,
the decision may well be unconstitutional because it infringes
upon the right to trial by jury, which until now both insurer
and insured have enjoyed.
IV. FURTHER PROPOSALS
If what is needed in excess liability cases is a relationship
between insurer and insured in which each party's conduct is
clearly spelled out so that the standard for the insurer's liabil-
ity does not rest on issues of fact,13' then the "solution" an-
nounced in Grundy is really no solution at all. Grundy simply
approach to determine when there should be trial by jury. See Sower, supra note 116,
at 174, citing Johnson v. Holbrook, 320 S.W.2d 608, 610 (Ky. 1957).
3' Brief for Grundy as Amicus Curiae at 6-11, Manchester Ins. & Indem. Co. v.
Grundy, 531 S.W.2d 493 (Ky. 1975): "In this Commonwealth, actions for damages for
breach of contract have always been cognizable at law, and those laws which deprive
a litigant of his right to trial by jury have been consistently ruled violative of section 7
of the Kentucky Constitution." Id. at 7; The brief stated that the Court specifically
held, in Brandenburg v. Bums, 451 S.W.2d 413 (Ky. 1970) that "the fact that a number
of items are involved does not convert a legal issue into an equitable one." Id. at 11.
"I Keeton, supra note 2, at 1183.
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shifts fact-finding decisions from the jury to the judge. In
addition, although the new standard favors the insured more
than the former bad faith standard, arguably it will not be a
strong enough deterrent to keep insurance companies from
being careless or too self-promoting in handling settlements.
3 2
The solution favored by most commentators and some
courts is strict liability for excess liability cases.' 3 There are
several important benefits of that theory in this area. First the
liability of the insurer would not be based on questions of fact.
If there had been an offer to settle which the company refused,
the company would bear the risk of loss if a judgment were
returned for an amount over the policy limit. No questions as
to whether the insurer had exposed the insured to an
"unreasonable risk" would have to be decided. Second, strict
liability would focus the attention of the insured and his in-
surer on the original tort suit, not on its present emphasis, the
excess liability suit that might follow. Although strict liability
might raise the cost of premiums slightly, insurance is meant
to be a cost spreader. Moreover, not having to worry about a
following excess liability suit would save time and money.
Finally, contrary to the fears of opponents of the theory, low-
limit policies would not be encouraged. In fact, insureds would
most likely attempt to buy higher premiums in order to force
the insurance company to offer a settlement.' 34
The primary objection to strict liability is that while the
present theory of recovery is based on a breach of an implied
covenant of good faith found in all contracts, absolute liability
has no basis in the contract. Such a theory would make irrele-
"I One of the benefits of the more liberal decisions in the country has been to make
insurers more careful in their handling of lawsuits, see Evans, The Practical Handling
by Defense Counsel of Lawsuits in Excess of Policy Limits, 1960 INs. L.J. 565. However,
because of the pro-insured decisions, insurance companies have begun to demand
declaratory judgments as to whether the insurer has a duty to defend or settle. If the
insurer gets a judgment, it can avoid costly litigation. If the declaratory judgment
holds that the insurer does not have to settle, it is difficult for the insured to establish
bad faith because institution of the declaratory action is indicative of good faith on
the part of the insurer. Moreover, declaratory judgments are an effective procedural
device to allow the insurer to withhold payment. Hirsch, C. Carpenter, M. Carpenter,
Strict Liability: A Response to the Gruenberg-Silberg Conflict, 7 Sw. U. L. REV. 310,
331, 334 (1975).
'3 See note 7, supra.
134 Id.
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vant any question as to whether the insurer had acted pru-
dently or in good faith in rejecting a settlement. Most courts
would be reluctant to read into contracts an implied right to
recover every time there was an excess judgment no matter how
careful and honest the insurer had been in refusing to settle.
Further, insurance companies contend that the adoption of
strict liability would allow recoveries which had not been paid
for by the premiums.'1 Because of these objections, although
strict liability may be a solution worthy of consideration, it was
explicitly rejected for Kentucky in Grundy.'3
Many other solutions have been proposed for excess liabil-
ity suits: Placing the burden of proof of freedom from fault
upon the insurance company, while reserving to the court, as
a question of law, whether the offer should reasonably have
been accepted;'3 7 reforming the insurance contract to explain
more clearly the rights and duties of the insured; or making the
policy limit twice as high in the event an offer is refused with
excess judgment resulting.' 31 Another suggestion has been to
encourage courts to admit the role they have been taking in
rewriting contracts to prevent abuse of bargaining power and
to leave to the courts the responsibility to "evolve a set of
realistic principles designed specifically to cope with standard
contracts of adhesion.'
'3 9
The Grundy standard, although not as favorable to in-
sureds as standards adopted by some other jurisdictions, was
much needed' In view of the Supreme Court's reluctance to
make any radical changes in the standard, however,'4 ' what
may be needed is an extra-judicial solution set up by insurance
" Levit, The Crisci Case-Something Old, Something New, 1968 INs. L.J. 12, 20.
W' 531 S.W.2d at 499.
,3, Annot., 40 A.L.R.2d 173 (1955).
1' Austin & Locke, Handling the Excess Coverage Situation for the Insurer, 36
INS. COUNSEL L.J. 60, 63-64 (1969), in which concern was expressed that although this
was attempted in one policy, see Georgia Life Ins. Co. v. Mississippi Cent. R. Co., 76
So. 646 (Miss. 1917), today courts would void the policy and the insurer would still
have to defend himself if the judgment were for more than twice the policy limits.
,' Sackville, supra note 5, at 100.
' Specifically, the Court did not list whether the insurer properly investigated
so as to enable him to evaluate the case properly as a factor to be considered; nor did
it demand that the insurer give at least equal consideration to the interests of the
insured.
" 531 S.W.2d at 499.
19761
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companies or by the legislature. One of the most sensible pro-
posals has come from an insurer: "Questions of excess coverage
are going to continue to arise until such time as companies
either take the limits off policies or insist upon writing them
in an adequate amount for an adequate premium."'4 This ap-
proach suggests that the insurer should promote higher prem-
iums which offer to settle within the limits.' Similar proposals
have been suggested since 1954,'1 4 yet insurance companies
have made little or no effort to solve their own problem.
Because there are so many practical difficulties involved
in instigating the above suggestions, the most feasible solution
may be legislation.' Insurance is already a highly regulated
business in Kentucky.'46 The legislature has recognized the
need to protect the public from this huge business with its vast
bargaining power by adopting an Insurance Code. Further
changes could easily be fit into this framework. The legislature
has the power to reform the insurance contract which the Ken-
tucky Supreme Court and many other courts are reluctant to
do. Adoption of the strict liability standard should be consid-
ered by the legislature.'47 Alternatively, a board of review under
the control of the insurance commissioner could be set up to
determine whether a suit should have been settled. This would
solve the problem of having "unqualified" judges or juries de-
cide the outcome of excess liability suits."" Practical guidelines
for evaluating whether suits should be settled could be formu-
lated by the board; if the insurer met the guidelines, the legis-
lators could create a presumption that it had not acted in bad
faith. At the very least the legislature could make sure that
insurance policies are rewritten to make clear to the policy-
holder the risk he takes by accepting a low-limit policy.'49
142 Appleman, Circumstances Creating Excess Liability, 1960 INS. L.J. 553, 555.
,' Id. at 554.
'" Keeton, supra note 2, at 1183-84.
"' See Levit, The Crisci Case-Something Old, Something New, 1968 INs. L.J. 12;
Comment, Excess Liability: Reconsideration of California's Bad Faith Negligence
Rule, 18 STAN. L. REV. 475 (1966).
'" KRS ch. 304 (1971).
1 However, bills to impose strict liability have been introduced unsuccessfully
in at least three state legislatures. GREGORY & KALVEN, JR., CASES AND MATERIALS ON
ToRTs 601 (1959).
"I Comment, Excess Liability: Reconsideration of California's Bad Faith Negli-
gence Rule, 18 STAN. L. REV. 475, 482 (1966).
"I Appleman, Circumstances Creating Excess Liability, 1960 INS. L.J. 553, 555.
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CONCLUSION
The conflict over who should pay in excess liability suits
has occurred because, while the insured would prefer settle-
ment in every case, the insurer has full contractual power to
refuse to settle if it believes it may gain by a jury verdict. It
would be basically unfair to allow the insurer to refuse to settle
even when the refusal is almost certain to result in an excess
judgment which the insured has to pay. Recognizing this,
courts have imposed an extra-contractual duty on the insurer
to settle in certain circumstances, although courts have been
understandably reluctant to redefine express contractual terms
which leave settlement decisions entirely to the insurer. Most
courts want to benefit the insured, but uncertainty as to the
standard they can impose on the insurer has resulted in great
confusion. The Kentucky Supreme Court in Manchester Insur-
ance & Indemnity Co. v. Grundy took a step toward ending
some of this confusion with its new, more objective definition
of the bad faith standard, although its treatment of the civil
jury is more questionable. Taking the determination of bad
faith from the jury may be an improvement which will benefit
both parties. There are several difficulties with this part of the
decision, however. Now that the standard has been clarified, a
properly instructed jury could probably decide the case, and it
is debatable whether a trial judge is more qualified to decide
issues of fact than a jury. No other jurisdiction has taken the
issue of excess liability from the jury except, of course, where
there are no debatable issues of fact. Further, both insured and
insurer may well be unconstitutionally deprived of the right to
trial by jury which they formerly enjoyed. It is hoped that the
benefits gained by the new standard will not be offset by the
benefits which may have been lost by taking the determination
of the standard from the jury.
The Grundy solution, although redefining the law in a
manner which may be more equitable to both insured and in-
surer leaves some basic conflicts unresolved. The insurer still
does not have a clear understanding of what conduct is re-
quired of it; the insured has been left short of the protection
he needs. A solution such as the imposition of strict liability
upon the insurer would solve both of these difficulties, yet the
Court expressly rejected such a proposal. Rewriting insurance
1976]
248 KENTUCKY LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 65
policies is another suggestion which could do much to accom-
plish the desirable results. Yet insurance companies have re-
fused to take the initiative. It remains for the legislature, then,
to reform the insurance contract. Further, the legislature has
the power and responsibility to insure, by repealing or redraft-
ing Rule 39.01(3) that the former right to trial by jury of the
excess liability issue will not be wrongfully denied. Excess lia-
bility problems will become even more prevalent in the future
as the need for and cost of insurance skyrockets. Grundy is an
attempt to solve the problems of today. The question is: How
long will its solution remain viable?
Katharine R. Crawford
